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Abstract 
During the Asian crisis, intermediate exchange rate regimes 
vanished. It has been argued that those regimes were no longer useful 
and only the extremes remained valid. The paper analyses three 
foreign exchange regimes: Argentina (pegged), Chile (band) and 
Mexico (float). The Argentinean currency board delivered low 
financial volatility while it was credible, but even then it displayed 
high real volatility. Mexican float performed well in periods of 
instability isolating the real sector. The Chilean band delivered a 
mixed outcome as compared to Argentina and Mexico. This is linked 
apparently to a loss in bands credibility, associated to policy 
mismanagement and an over-appreciation in the biennium before the 
crisis. Optimal exchange rate regimes vary across time and the 
conjuncture. Exit strategies are part of the election of the optimal 
system, including a flexible policy package rather than a single rigid 
policy tool. 
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Introduction 
One common feature of countries most affected by the Asian 
crisis and its waves such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Republic of 
Korea and Brazil is that they had exchange rate systems which in 
different versions were closer to pegged systems rather than floating 
systems (they were often called soft pegs). Countries with exchange 
rate bands such as Israel, Chile and Colombia also suffered. On the 
contrary, floating countries such as Australia, New Zealand and 
Mexico behaved apparently better. Based on that, many observers have 
concluded that the intermediate exchange rate systems are dangerous 
and that optimality would be located in the extremes. This chapter will 
evaluate such a conclusion by analysing three experiences of different 
exchange rate systems: Argentina, Chile and Mexico. These countries 
have had diverging exchange rate (ER) policies, at least formally.1 
A straight observation of recent events is that countries with 
pegged systems, such as the currency boards Hong Kong and 
Argentina, did suffer significant contagion in times of international 
financial stress. Argentina experienced deep recessions during both the 
Mexican and the Asian crises. Hong Kong suffered a recession as a 
consequence of the Asian crisis but during the Mexican crisis growth 
merely decelerated from 5.4% in 1994 to 4.0% in 1995. There are 
reasons to believe that completely rigid exchange rate systems may 
amplify external shocks. Apparently, they put too strong and therefore 
unrealistic requirements on domestic flexibility, in particular on wage 
and price flexibility. The amplification effect arises because during an 
external shock agents may consider that a shock that is strong 
enough can induce authorities to  modify  exchange rate  policy; this is 
                                                 
1 See Fischer (2001) and Levy and Sturzenneger (1999) for a classification of ER Regimes. 
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particularly so when the exchange rate appears to be too appreciated. Rigid systems are therefore 
prone to changes in market sentiment and credibility (eventually, with the exception of full 
dollarization). 
In its turn, bands did not behave well during the Asian crisis. In many cases, that was 
partially induced by the actual management of the band. The huge increase in capital inflows to 
emerging economies that took place between 1990 and 1997, did put severe upward pressure on the 
value of domestic currencies. The response in terms of expanding the size of the band or 
appreciating it induced a credibility loss. Subsequently, bands had trouble in adapting to a new real 
exchange rate when the Asian crisis appeared and capital inflows suddenly stopped. These facts 
aggravated the bands mismanagement and therefore induced a further credibility loss. The major 
benefit of the band system arises in times of normality, without severe or one-sided shocks. In that 
case, bands induce more exchange rate stability keeping the ability to partially absorb the effects of 
standard shocks. Consequently, the exchange rate fulfils more efficiently its allocative role between 
tradables and non-tradables. The main trouble with bands appears in times of financial distress. 
After a general discussion (section I), the chapter will examine the experiences of three 
symbolic cases of different exchange rate policies. On the currency board side, we consider the 
experience of Argentina (section II) in order to understand the appeal this system has had for other 
countries, some of which later did dollarize. We do not analyse here We examine Chile (section III) 
in the case of intermediate regimes and Mexico (section IV) in the floating side. The analysis will 
focus in the period during the Asian crisis. 
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I. Exchange rate regime and 
stability of financial and real 
sectors 
The Asian crisis and its aftermath represented a considerable 
shock not only for Asian countries but Latin Americans as well, 
whereas with different intensities. Chile was by far the country most 
directly affected given its significant trade relations with Asia. But as 
emerging markets spreads increased, especially after the Russian 
default, Brazil and Argentina also felt its consequences. Later the 
Brazilian devaluation further introduced uncertainties that affected all 
Latin America. We are examining therefore a period of instability and 
big shocks. 
Table 1 compares the outcome in terms of financial and output 
volatility of several countries with different initial exchange rate 
regimes, in the specific period immediately after the explosion of the 
Asian crisis. In order to compare financial and real volatility, we 
construct a financial volatility index (FVI), which can be computed 
independently of the exchange rate regime.2 If CV denotes the 
coefficient of variation, the index is defined simply as 
FVI = CV(ER)+CV(Reserves)+CV(Nominal interest rates) 
When a country faces a period of stress, it normally reacts 
by depreciating the exchange rate, selling international reserves 
or increasing  interest  rates. In  fixed ER regimes, volatility  appears in  
                                                 
2 See a recent discussion on sources of volatility in Latin American economies in Rodrik (2001).  
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reserves and interest rates, while in a pure float volatility should appear in the exchange rate and 
interest rates. Bands or dirty floating systems combine all three elements. Real sector volatility is 
captured using the standard deviation of GDP growth. 
Table 1 
VOLATILITY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES DURING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TURMOIL 
(Period 1997Q3 - 1999Q4) 



















  (a) (b) (c) (a)+(b)+(c)  
Argentina Fixed 0 7.9 13.1 21.0 5.3 
Hong Kong Fixed 0.1 3.9 23.0 27.0 5.5 
Australia Float 5.7 14.5 14.2 34.4 0.6 
Mexico Float 8.5 5.6 22.6 36.7 1.9 
New Zealand Float 7.8 5.7 27.4 41.0 2.3 
Chile Band 8.2 8.2 31.1 47.5 5.3 
Colombia Band 16.7 8.2 26.4 51.3 4.5 
Thailand Soft peg 9.4 9.0 42.1 60.5 7.3 
Malaysia Soft peg 9.8 19.0 37.9 66.7 7.8 
Brazil Soft peg 25.1 26.8 26.4 78.3 1.6 
Korea Soft peg 14.8 36.4 30.7 81.9 8.5 
Source:   Own calculation based on IMF data. 
 
The table ranks countries after their financial volatility index, and we obtain five important and 
to some extent surprising conclusions about the role of exchange rate policy during the Asian crisis: 
(a) the ranking following the financial volatility index groups countries according to their 
exchange rate system, 
(b) fixed systems appear to have delivered more nominal stability than alternative systems, 
but they display more volatility in real variables, namely GDP growth, 
(c) floating regimes present the lowest volatility in GDP, while they have a higher 
financial volatility than fixed systems, 
(d) soft pegs display the worst combination of financial and real volatility, 
(e) bands belong to an intermediate ground, with higher financial volatility than credible 
fixed systems and more real volatility than floating regimes. 
Some qualifications are required at this point. First, the apparent smaller financial volatility in 
fixed exchange rate regimes is probably due to the fact that in this particular period (1997Q3–
1999Q4) there were no serious challenges in Argentina or Hong Kong to the stability of the 
exchange rate policy.3 Therefore, the right conclusion is that a credible fixed exchange rate policy 
delivers high financial stability. But from this observation it also follows that, despite having had 
credible ER policies, Argentina or Hong Kong also had high output volatility. 
In the case of Argentina, some observers have signalled that the problem is the rigidity in the 
labour market, but the fact that in this period Hong Kong displayed a worse volatility record leads 
to think that such an argument may be overplayed. Moreover, if we compare inflationary records, 
they are not so dissimilar. Moreover, in this same period the cumulative annual inflation in 
                                                 
3 That becomes evident when we consider Argentina in 2001. 
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Argentina was -0.4% while in Hong Kong it was 1.8%. Prices therefore had been contributing 
towards a real depreciation in Argentina more intensively than in Hong Kong.4 
Second, as we shall see, the Chilean band was already suffering lack of credibility over the 
period considered. Hence, faced to a shock as strong as the Asian crisis, when the stabilising 
properties of the rigid part of the band mechanism should have appeared, they did not because 
credibility had been lost. Hence, once again, the right conclusion is that when faced to a shock, a 
non-credible band delivers high volatility, both financial and real. What cannot be argued is that the 
lack of credibility is inherent to the band system. 
Third, soft pegs displayed the worst behaviour. Analysed ex post, soft peggers all had 
repressed exchange rates and in some cases the market did not have enough information concerning 
fundamentals (short-term external liabilities, for instance). When a currency is overvalued and there 
is pressure for correction, soft peg systems are prone to speculation and, henceforth, financial 
volatility. 
Four, floating regimes did better in terms of real variables but less so in terms of financial 
volatility. Beyond exchange rate volatility inherent to a floating system, interest rates did swing in 
floating countries as much as they did in countries with pegged systems. Flotation could not avoid 
interest rate volatility. As is clear from table 1, policy reactions differ considerably across countries. 
For instance, despite the float, Australia used quite intensively its international reserves, which is 
less so the case for New Zealand that used more intensively interest rates. Within the floaters, 
Mexico was the one that more intensively did rest on the exchange rate. 
Table 1 also suggests that each country chose different combinations of nominal depreciation, 
reserve accumulation or interest rate changes when facing shocks. It appears that, for the countries 
in the sample and during this period, the less harmful financial response in terms of growth was 
volatility in the exchange rate, as may be seen in figure 1. This implies that the exchange-rate may 
have been an effective policy for producing the necessary expenditure-switching that allowed 
reducing the net demand for tradables and minimizing its impact on non-tradables.5 Second, it 
appears that the most harmful are interest rate responses. This shows that the adjustment of the 
external disequilibria tended to work as a global demand-reducing tool, generating unemployment 
of labour and capital in non-tradable sectors. 
Beyond the exchange rate system, the countrys ability to smooth the cycle is associated to 
the sort of financial integration that countries do have with the rest of the world. The US may run an 
enormous current account deficit but the market does not ask for its immediate correction (and the 
authorities do not think either it is necessary), as has happened in many events in Latin America. 
Among others, two reasons can be mentioned. One is that foreigners have a demand for dollar-
denominated assets. The other is that the US does not need to make its financial obligations 
contingent on commodity price movements as its economy is so diversified that the negative 
covariance of shocks is probably strong enough to stabilise overall risk. 
Hence, to better smooth the domestic impact of external shocks, it appears necessary to 
improve the quality of Latin American financial links with the rest of the world. Three channels 
have being discussed more recently. One is creating foreign demand for assets denominated in the 
national currency inspired in the Australia and New Zealand cases. The degree of international 
financial integration of these two OECD countries is not comparable with a typical emerging 
economy. Among other things, they have offshore markets for securities issued in domestic 
currencies (Hawkins, 2003). They are therefore more able to hedge their exposure to exchange rate 
                                                 
4 However, we are not controlling here by the degree of overvaluation of the exchange rate in each country. It is evident that because 
in Argentina the ER was used explicitly as an anti-inflationary device and did appreciate sharply in 1991-1992, the required fall in 
domestic prices and wages was notably stronger than what effectively took place. 
5 This feature does not tackle the problem posed by the negative effect of real exchange-rate instability on the production of tradables 
and on the diversification of exports. See Caballero and Corbo (1990) and ECLAC (1998). 
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risk in their non-tradable sectors6. Second, Caballero (2001) has developed formally an argument: 
Financial instruments are incomplete in the sense that they are not contingent on the main shocks 
faced by these economies. If Chilean bonds were contingent on the price of copper, an external 
shock would be less demanding in terms of current account adjustment.7 It is not obvious that a 
typical emerging economy may move quickly in any of these two directions. Third, quality of 
financial links can be improved with macroeconomic prudential policies concerning excessive 
short-term or liquid external liabilities, the size of the external deficit and the appreciation of the 
RER in periods of capital surges.8 
Figure 1 
















Source:  Own calculations based on IMF numbers. Each point represents the ordered pair of volatility 
in GDP and some definition of financial volatility (in ER, reserves or interest rates). Numbers on linear 
regressions refer to the partial correlation. 
 
The main benefit of the floating regime appears when significant long-lasting shocks emerge 
abruptly. In that case, a pure floating regime delivers a rapid adjustment in the exchange rate and 
authorities stay out of the scene keeping its credibility intact, except when depreciation leads to 
inflation and the country uses inflation targeting. By increasing the exchange rate risk perceived by 
the public, it also better prepares agents to sudden shocks. But on the other side, floating regimes 
deliver significantly higher exchange rate instability across the cycle, which may have harmful 
effects on growth, with inefficient allocative signals. In particular, a floating regime cannot avoid 
overvaluation in episodes of capital surges. 
                                                 
6 A recent effort to move in this direction concerns Chile. There have been two bond issues, one by the IADB and another by the 
Government of Uruguay in instruments denominated in Chilean pesos indexed to Chilean inflation.  
7 Chile developed an efficient proxy by establishing a copper stabilization fund. Other countries have also utilised funds, such as the 
Fondo Cafetero in Colombia, or the Oil Stabilization Funds in Mexico and Venezuela. 
8 RER misalignment can also result in developed economies such as the huge swings of the US dollar in the 1990s and the sharp 
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Now we analyse briefly the behaviour of ER regimes in period since the Mexican crisis and 
up to 1999, using our measures of financial and real volatility. In figure 2 the country sample is 
disaggregated according to three different subperiods: one around the Mexican crisis defined as 
1994Q4 until 1996Q1, a normal one between 1996Q2 and 1997Q3, and one from 1997Q4 until 
1999Q4, the Asian crisis. 
Figure 2 

















Source:  Authors elaboration based on IMF data. Periods: Mexican crisis, 95=1994Q4-1996Q1. No crisis, 
96-97=1996Q2-1997Q3. Asian crisis, 98=1997Q4-1999Q4. 
 
Figure 2 suggests that, in crisis periods, there is a higher correlation between financial and 
real volatility than in normal periods. In normal periods, the correlation between financial and real 
variables is almost zero. However, such a correlation varies between crisis and, surprisingly, it 
indicates that it was higher in the Mexican than in the Asian crisis. This may be explained by the 
fact that the degree of contagion was quite reduced during the Mexican crisis as among the 
countries in the sample it only affected Argentina, beyond Mexico itself.9 Hence, the high R2 
reflects more a statistical issue rather than an economic one. 
Another look at the data is to decompose them according to the exchange rate regime 
prevailing at the beginning of each period. This means that Mexico appears in the group band in 
one period and as a float in the latter two. Figure 3 illustrates this decomposition. It shows that, 
across crises, the more stable behaviour in financial and real terms is delivered by floating regimes. 
When negative shocks arrive, all systems but floating deliver high financial and real volatility. In 
this sense, soft pegs show the worst behaviour. Pegged systems appear with a curious property: 
without negative shocks, they display low real and financial volatility, but when there is a shock, 
financial volatility remains grossly the same and the shock basically translates into real sector 
                                                 
9 Countries not included in the sample were also subjects of contagion, like Peru and Uruguay. 
R 2  = 0.85 
R 2 = 0.13 
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volatility. Bands show a similar behaviour with respect to real volatility in stress periods but with a 
higher financial volatility. 
Figure 3 

















Source:  Authors elaboration based on IMF data. 
 
It is interesting to note that in normal times, floating delivers relatively more financial 
volatility that the rest of the systems. During crisis, overall volatility is reduced in floating 
regimes.10 
From the perspective of the above considerations, an ideal but crude exchange rate system 
that would seek to minimize real sector volatility could involve a two stepped approach. In normal 
times, when shocks are small and uniformly distributed, managed flexibility or a crawling-band 
increases stability and therefore growth. When big shocks appear and their distribution is biased, in 
the same negative direction (terms of trade fall, external financing declines, etc.), then ideally one 
should switch to a floating regime temporarily. How to implement such a system is complex, 
starting with the trouble of identifying when shocks are big or small, temporary or permanent.11 
Moreover, since to be successful, fixed exchange rate regimes need full credibility independently of 
the shock suffered, such an ideal switching exchange rate system is incompatible with a fixed rate 
system. 
 
                                                 
10 Braga et al. (2001) praise for Don’t fix, Don’t float is in line with this sort of argument. 
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II. Argentina: low inflation and 
output volatility under the 
currency board 
After hyperinflation in 1989 and 1990, Argentina adopted an 
extreme exchange rate policy, the currency board. This system shares 
with a traditional fixed exchange rate system that the national 
currency, in this case the peso, is linked in a given proportion to a 
foreign currency. In Argentina, the parity was fixed on a one-to-one 
basis with the US dollar. In the traditional fixed exchange rate system, 
the Central Bank has the ability to realign the parity at discretion and 
the freedom to control the quantity of high-powered money. In the 
Argentinean currency board instead, the parity was fixed by law (the 
Convertibility Law), and the Central Bank is forced to back any 
increase in high-powered money with an accumulation of international 
reserves. In this sense, it is an extreme version of a fixed exchange rate 
system, with no space for domestic macroeconomic policy. Of course, 
the most radical option is simply to suppress the domestic currency 
and fully dollarize. 
The main reason behind the adoption of the currency board in 
Argentina was to fight hyperinflation in 1991. In this sense, the 
strategy was deliberately to use the exchange rate as an anti-
inflationary device. Between 1975 and 1990, the smallest inflation rate 
in Argentina was 90% in 1986 and during the hyperinflation years it 
reached 3.079% in 1989 and 2.314% in 1990. Associated with the 
currency board, annual inflation went down below 5% since 1994. The 
average annual inflation rate between 1996 and 2000 was -0.3%. 
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At the same time that inflation was collapsing, GDP growth was accelerating. After an 
average rate of -0.9% in the eighties, growth resumed and averaged 4.1% in the nineties. The 
average result was the outcome of three main factors. 
First, around the time Convertibility was adopted, international liquidity increased 
significantly. Until 1994, Argentina was able to attract a huge amount of capital flows, further 
encouraged by its massive privatisation program. This, in combination with the mechanics of the 
convertibility described before, resulted in a significant stimulus to aggregate demand, expectations 
and economic activity.12 Average GDP growth in the period 1991-1994 was 7.9%. At the end of 
1994, Mexico devalued its currency and the suspicion that Argentina would follow suit increased its 
sovereign risk from 434 bp over Treasuries in 1994 to 1,259 in 1995 (table 2). Net capital inflows of 
US$ 4.3 billion in the last quarter of 1994 reversed abruptly to outflows of US$ 3.3 billion in the 
first quarter of 1995. The result was a severe recession in which GDP fell 2.9% in 1995 and open 
unemployment rose to 18%. However, in the period 1996 to 1998 capital flows returned and 
together with it output recovery. Between September 1998 and February 1999, the Russian default 
and the Brazilian devaluation took place, which again induced capital outflows and a longer 
recession lasting over three years. Hence, the Argentine experience since 1995 is one of low growth 
accompanied by a significant volatility, associated to the instability of capital flows. 
Table 2 
ARGENTINA: CAPITAL FLOWS, REAL EXCHANGE RATE AND  
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 1994-1999 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Current account balance (US$ 
million) 
-11,158 -5,191 -6,843 -12,497 -14,603 -12,312 
Net foreign direct investment 
(US$ million) 
2,620 4,112 5,348 5,503 4,546 22,665 
Net portfolio investment (US$ 
million) 
8,389 1,893 9,832 10,887 8,337 -6,323 
All others (US$ million) 341 -1,100 -3,451 835 4,990 -1,637 
Change in reserves (US$ million) -675 -2,311 3,258 3,162 4,090 2,013 
Total capital inflows (US$ million) 10,484 2,879 10,100 15,659 18,694 14,325 
 Without FDI (US$ million) 7,864 -1,233 4,752 10,156 14,148 -8,340 
Average spread over FRB  434 1,259 635 301 608 726 
Growth of money supply (%) 11.6 -1.8 14.4 12.3 -0.9 -2.9 
External debt/exports (%)a 540.8 470.1 461.0 471.3 530.6 606.9 
External debt/GDP (%)a 33.3 38.2 40.3 42.5 46.9 50.1 
Terms of trade index (annual 
average) 101.5 101.8 109.8 108.4 102.5 96.4 
GDP growth (%) 5.8 -2.9 5.5 8.1 3.9 -3.0 
Real exchange rate (average 
1987-1990 = 100) 58.6 66.0 67.9 66.1 64.2 56.6 
Source:  BBVA, IMF/EFI. 
a  Outstanding public and private debt at year end, as a share of annual exports and annual GDP, respectively. 
 
Second, the acceleration of growth in the first half of the 1990s was not only the result of 
capital inflows but also the outcome of some important structural reforms, two of which merit 
specific mention, trade reform and privatisation. Trade policy in Argentina took place under the 
framework of MERCOSUR; the free trade agreement Argentina signed with Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay. Associated to this trade liberalisation, exports soared from US$ 18 billion in 1990 to a 
peak of US$ 34 billion in 1998. Concerning privatisation, as described in Larraín and Winograd 
(1997), given the initial size of the public sector and the low productivity levels in public 
                                                 
12 In the meantime, the real exchange rate appreciated sharply, the deficit on current account rose and gross capital formation recovered 
only modestly (Frenkel et al., 1998). 
CEPAL  SERIE Informes y estudios especiales No 10 
17 
companies, the massive program undertaken in the first half of the nineties resulted in huge gains in 
the average value added per worker in privatised firms, specially in the non tradable sector. The 
result was not only a positive impact on growth but also it collaborated in partially correcting the 
over-appreciation of the real exchange rate.13,14 
Third, a most relevant and usually ignored factor, the acceleration of growth in Argentina is 
linked to the poor recessive starting point. Take as a benchmark 1974, the year when real GDP per 
capita reached its peak. Since then, there was a steady deterioration in this indicator. By 1990, the 
year before convertibility was adopted, real GDP per capita was 16% below that of 1974, and GDP 
had decreased sharply since 1988. Two readings can be made henceforth. One is that Convertibility 
and the structural reforms already mentioned were able to change the path of a long-standing loss in 
output per capita. The second one is that growth was relatively easy to achieve initially, due to the 
significant wedge between actual GDP and potential GDP.15 
The growth recovery in the early nineties and the impressive drop in inflation are probably 
the main reasons why Convertibility was able to attract so much attention in the international 
economy. However, the currency board exhibited pitfalls, mainly its dependence on international 
capital flows, a variable that is far off the sphere of influence of the domestic authorities. On top of 
that, volatility has increased due to a relatively new phenomenon in the international economy: 
financial contagion and the globalization of financial volatility (Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo, 
2001). But contagion attacks all countries more or less equally, the difference among them being 
the differential in economic fundamentals and the capacity to correct them, particularly when they 
are misaligned. A fixed exchange rate system adds another potential risk, namely forced 
realignment, normally preceded by efforts to avoid it. In this sense, fixed exchange rate systems 
may amplify the original external shock. 
In table 2 it is shown that in the recession years, 1995 and 1999, capital flows received by 
Argentina decreased significantly. The other side of the coin is the significant increase in sovereign 
spread. Between 1994 and 1995, as said above, the differential cost of borrowing for the public 
sector increased by 825 bp. After a sharp drop in 1996 and again in 1997, during the Asian crisis the 
spread increased to 608 bp in 1998 and 726 bp in 1999. In the context of an open capital account, 
this implies in its turn an increase in the domestic cost of borrowing. 
Both the reduced capital inflows and the more expensive cost of borrowing resulted in 
sudden stops in money supply growth. All this led to two significant recessions, one relatively short 
in 1995 with a loss of 2.9% in real GDP and another quite long, 1999 and 2000 in which GDP fell 
3.0% and 1.0% respectively. Indeed, Argentina and Uruguay are the only two Latin-American 
countries, which have suffered a domestic recession in both recent international financial crises.16 
 
                                                 
13 Most of the privatised companies belonged to the non-tradable sector. In these firms, average productivity per worker rose after 
privatisation. The link to real exchange rate is because, contrary to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, in which a net productivity growth 
in the tradable sector induces a real appreciation of the currency, the transmission mechanism is through a reduction in the real cost 
of the services produced by that companies. 
14 This productivity gain does not consider that all unemployed had zero productivity. As such, overall productivity growth, measured 
considering not only employed people but all the labour force, increased by much less. 
15 As a matter of fact, annual growth in 19882000 was merely 2.3%. The GAP between effective and potential GDP in 1991 can be 
assumed to have been notably large. 
16 Several LACs experienced a recessive GAP (GAP between effective and potential GDP), but absolute GDP kept rising. Actually, 
average GDP growth dropped from 5.2% both in 1994 and 1997, to 1.1% in 1995 and 0.3% in 1999). 
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III. The crawling-band approach in 
Chile 
In the early 1990s, in a context of massive capital inflows, 
Chilean authorities identified two main priorities for macroeconomic 
management and particularly exchange rate policy. First, in an 
economy prone to huge cycles,17 it was crucial to achieve sustained 
macroeconomic stability. Second, it was also crucial to emphasise 
growth as the dominant criteria to lead policy-making. This meant 
assigning exports a strategic role, both in terms of its expansion and 
diversification. 
Several works, including Caballero and Corbo (1990) and more 
recently ECLAC (1998, ch. IV) document that in order for exports to 
be an engine of growth, the level and stability of the real exchange rate 
(RER) are crucial. Chilean authorities considered that this objective 
could be placed in jeopardy if capital surges cause excessive RER 
appreciation and greater future volatility if the direction of net flows 
goes into reverse. 
Authorities opted in the early 1990s to regulate the foreign 
exchange market and capital inflows in order to prevent large 
misalignments in the RER relative to what they assumed to be its long-
term trend. The option chosen was to try to make long-term 
fundamentals prevail over short-term factors. The underlying 
assumption was that there existed an asymmetry of behaviour between 
the  market  and monetary  authorities:  the latter  should  have a longer  
                                                 
17 In 1975 and 1982 Chile had experienced the sharpest recessions in all of Latin America; see Ffrench-Davis (2002, chs. 1 and 6). 
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planning horizon when they seek a sustainable real macroeconomic stability, in contrast with 
private agents who operate more intensively at the short-term end of the market and are rewarded 
for profits in that term. In order to deal with market uncertainty, rather than a unique price, 
authorities used a crawling-band centred on a reference price; this price was linked to a basket of 
the dollar, the deutsche mark and the yen, with weights associated to their share in Chilean trade.18 
The centre of the band crawled according to inflation differential criteria, hence, following a PPP 
rule adjusted by estimates of net productivity improvements in Chile. 
The changes taking place in global financial markets, the increasing international approval of 
Chilean economic policies, high domestic interest rates, and a smooth transition to democracy 
stimulated a growing capital inflow towards Chile since mid-1990, earlier and relatively stronger 
than to other emerging economies. 
The events were quickly reflected in an appreciating RER. Beginning in July 1990, the 
market rate was in the appreciated extreme of the band. During the next months economic 
authorities designed a new macroeconomic policy. The policy reform, against the fashion in 
multilateral institutions and financial agents of an across-the-board opening of the capital account, 
was based on the perception that the large external supply of financing was not to be sustainable 
and short-term factors affecting the current account, such as a high price of copper, would tend to 
be reversed in the medium term.19 
A set of policies followed, directed to provide a prudential macroeconomic environment in 
order to achieve sustainable equilibria. In June 1991, a non-interest bearing reserve requirement of 
20% was established on foreign loans. Reserves had to be maintained at the Central Bank for a 
minimum of 90 days and a maximum of one year. 
Proponents of a dirty float within the central bank argued that the prevailing rules, with a 
pure band, an increasingly active informal market, and a more porous formal market, would lead to 
an observed exchange-rate leaning toward either extreme of the band (on the ceiling in 1989-1990; 
on the floor later). This recognition led the Bank in taking the decision to initiate the dirty floating 
in March of 1992. The rate fluctuated since then, for several years, within a range of 1 to 8 
percentage points above the floor, with the Bank continuing to make active purchases but also some 
sales (however, with a significant net accumulation of reserves). 
In the ensuing months, US interest rates continued to decline, encouraged by the recession it 
was experiencing, exerting pressure on the Central Bank of Chile. However, the Chilean economy 
was booming, and its GDP growth rate had risen into two digits. Consequently, for reasons of 
macroeconomic equilibrium, the Central Bank wanted to increase rather than lower domestic 
interest rates. In order to make space for monetary policy in the context of continued capital 
inflows, the reserve requirement was tightened. In May 1992, the reserve requirement was raised to 
30% and was extended to time deposits in foreign currency and in 1995 to purchases of Chilean 
secondary ADRs by foreigners. The period during which the deposit had to be maintained was 
extended to one year, regardless of the maturity of the inflow. Subsequently, there was a permanent 
monitoring in order to identify loopholes, which were then closed. In general evasion was rather 
limited (Le Fort and Lehmann, 2000; Zahler, 1998). 
The system of reserve requirements and taxes on foreign lending was directed to affect 
relative market prices. The implicit tax rate on inflows increased dramatically as maturities 
                                                 
18 Chile was a pioneer in implementing exchange rate policies that belong to the family of crawling-peg approaches (Williamson, 
1981). This happened between April 1965 and July 1970. Subsequently, from October 1973 to June 1979 a second experience of this 
kind was carried out. Finally, in the 1980s, after the 1982 crisis, a crawling-peg was reinstated that evolved to a crawling-band and 
survived until September 1999 (Ffrench-Davis, 2002, chs. 4 and 10).  
19 Additionally, Chile was coming out of a profound debt crisis, which had been accompanied by sharp exchange rate depreciation. 
Consequently, there was space for some equilibrating appreciation. However, as agents changed expectations from pessimism to 
optimism, they seek to reach a new desired stock of investment in the emerging market over a short period of time. This was 
expected to imply excessively large transitory inflows. 
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shortened. For instance, by 1995, for inflows with a one year term it stood at 4%, while for 90 days 
terms it represented a cost of 13% (Agosin and Ffrench-Davis 2001). With the Asian crisis, and the 
subsequent sharp scarcity of financial inflows, the reserve requirement rate was reduced to 10% and 
then to zero in 1998. 
As a result of the policy mix implemented in 1990-1994 plus the improved terms of trade in 
1995, when the Tequila crisis exploded in late 1994 and its contagious effect reached Argentina, 
Chile exhibited a solid external sector (a small deficit on current account, a sustainable exchange 
rate, and a limited amount of short-term external liabilities). 
Therefore, the across-the-board cut-off in liquid funding for Latin America did not dampen 
the Chilean economy. Towards mid-1995, capital flows began to return to the region, and with 
special intensity to Chile. 
Given the expectations of currency appreciation, when the Tequila shock was apparently left 
behind, the large interest rate differential between the peso and the dollar gave foreign portfolio and 
short-term investors a profitable one-way bet, in spite of the toll they had to pay for entering 
domestic financial markets (in the form of the reserve requirement). This trend toward appreciation 
could have been softened by intensifying price restrictions on inflows (i.e., increasing the height of 
the reserve requirement; Le Fort and Lehmann, 2000). However, the authorities kept rather 
unchanged the intensity of policy tools they were using in 1996-1997. As a consequence, capital 
inflows overwhelmed the domestic market. Then, the Central Bank was unable to prevent a 
significant real appreciation of the peso. The ensuing appreciation contributed to a widening of the 
current account deficit, which climbed to 5.7% of GDP in 1996-1997 (table 3). 
Table 3 
CHILE: CAPITAL FLOWS, EXCHANGE RATE AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 1990-2000 
 1990-1995 1996-1997 1998 1999 2000 
Actual GDP growth (%) 7.8 7.4 3.9 -1.1 5.4 
Productive capacity growth (%) 7.8 6.8 7.3 5.9 4.2 
Investment ratio (% of GDP) 26.1 31.6 32.2 26.9 26.6 
Inflation (%) 14.7 6.3 4.7 2.3 4.5 
Current account balance (% of GDP) -2.5 -5.7 -6.2 -0.2 -1.6 
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) 1.8 2.1 0.4 -1.5 0.1 
Terms of trade (% of GDP) 0.2 -1.4 -3.0 0.2 0.0 
Net capital inflows (% of GDP) 6.9 8.0 2.8 -0.9 1.7 
Real exchange rate (1986 = 100) 99.5 81.4 78.0 82.3 85.9 
Source:  Central Bank of Chile, and Ffrench-Davis (2002). 
a The terms of trade effect are expressed in current prices. 
 
In the negotiations for a free trade agreement with Canada, Chilean authorities successfully 
defended the permanence of the reserve requirement as a policy tool regulating financial inflows. 
But the generalized overoptimism in domestic and foreign financial markets and the widespread 
expectation that crises had been left behind and the risky temptation to speed the reduction of 
domestic inflation with exchange-rate appreciation, weakened a successful policy of sustainable 
macroeconomic equilibria. 
Some traces of the exchange-rate management did not help to deter speculative inflows after 
1995. In spite of its formal adhesion to a crawling band in 1996-1997, in order to appreciate the 
band (beyond a formal broadening of the band to ± 12.5%), the authorities tinkered in 1997 with the 
weights assigned to each currency, making the peg to a currency basket rather than the dollar less 
credible. In November 1994, the weight of the US dollar had been reduced from 50 to 45%, 
reflecting the falling incidence of that currency in Chilean trade. In January 1997, it was arbitrarily 
raised to 80%. Also, the external inflation used to correct the referential exchange rate was over-
estimated by 10 percentage points between 1995 and 1997, generating considerable additional 
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revaluation. Furthermore, an annual 2% appreciation of the reference rate had been set in November 
1995, based on the assumption that Chilean productivity was growing faster than that of its main 
trading partners. 
The Asian crisis notably worsened terms of trade in 1998-1999 and found Chile with an 
overvalued real exchange rate and a deficit on the current account over twice as large as the average 
for 1990-1995.20 Subsequently, capital outflows began in late 1997 and accelerated in 1998-1999, 
inducing an exchange rate depreciation, in the context of a relative price correction process, after 
the significant macroeconomic imbalance created in 1996-1997. 
Since 1991 capital outflows were facilitated as a way of alleviating appreciating pressures on 
the exchange rate. Pension funds were allowed to invest abroad, in gradual steps, up to 16% of their 
total assets. However, higher rates of return on financial assets in Chile than abroad and 
expectations of peso appreciation discouraged foreign investment by Chilean institutional investors. 
By mid 1997, pension funds had invested abroad merely 0.5% of their funds. Outflows 
mushroomed only with the Asian crisis, when the contagion to Chile reversed expectations from 
appreciation to depreciation. Within a short period, outflows by pension funds were equivalent to 
4.8% of GDP. This worsened the Chilean external position and was an important source of a sharp 
monetary contraction in 1998-1999. 
The Central Bank had been soft with the appreciating pressures in 1996-1997, but then 
asymmetrically turned to sharply repress the depreciating pressures by the end of 1997, arguing that 
in an overheated economy devaluation would be too inflationary. This way, only when the economy 
was already in recession, the Central Bank announced the suspension of the exchange rate band in 
September 1999 in order to allow for a substantial devaluation under a freely floating rate. 
The stabilizing properties of a band appear when there is credibility in its parameters, namely 
the level of the central parity, the rate of crawl and the bands width. The crawling band ―the 
intermediate regime in force in Chile until 1999― gradually lost credibility due to its 
mismanagement.21 Indeed, the lack of active intramarginal intervention designed to enforce the 
band, the various realignments to the central parity and/or the width of the band, the arbitrary 
changes in weights used to determine the central parity, all gave the signal that the parameters could 
change on demand.22 Finally, the monetary authority recognized only lately the need to correct an 
excessively appreciated real exchange rate. 
The period of active policy towards capital inflows and management of the RER is correlated 
with a high rate of use of productive capacity. The negligible GAP between effective and potential 
GDP achieved in 1991-1997 proved to be a determinant factor behind the significant increase in 
capital formation and potential GDP (Agosin 1998). In fact, the investment ratio rose 10 points in 
1990-1998 with respect to 1982-1989, and GDP growth jumped from 2.9% per year to 7% (table 3). 
                                                 
20 An enlarged deficit on current account in 1995-1997, duly adjusted by the trend terms of trade, is a revealed proof of a too 
appreciated exchange rate, that adjusted faster than productivity improvements. We contend that actual appreciation in 1990-1994 
had been equilibrating (given the moderate deficit on current account and an appreciation softer than in all other emerging LACs). 
See Ffrench-Davis (2000, ch. 10). 
21 The band and its centre had been credible for a long period. Magendzo et al. (1998) using data until 1997, before the Asian crisis 
reached Chile, found that credibility in the band had decreased. They do not refer as to what extent there was enough credibility prior 
to it.  
22 In Krugman (1991), there is exogenous full credibility in the bands parameters without intramarginal intervention. The honey moon 
effect, that is, stabilising speculation, appears because of such credibility. In practice, credibility and reputation need to be built by 
the Central Bank. Intramarginal intervention directed to enforce the limits of the band is crucial since when that is not the case, 
speculation will tend to be destabilizing.  
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With the recessive adjustment in 1999 and the lack of vigorous recovery in 2000 and 2001, 
the investment ratio lost, nearly, one-half of its previous gain. Our interpretation is that the 
intensity of what was an unavoidable downward adjustment, was associated to the disequilibria 
built in 1996-1997, first with an excessive appreciation and then with the delay in allowing a 
depreciation in 1998. Subsequently, the authorities did not exploit all the positive features of the 
Chilean economy that would allow moving toward the production frontier, thus encouraging 
economic employment and capital formation. 
 

CEPAL  SERIE Informes y estudios especiales No 10 
25 
IV. Mexico, the oldest floating in 
Latin America 
The adoption of a floating exchange rate regime was not an 
option in Mexico. It was the outcome of a full-scale balance of 
payment crisis in December 1994. Before that, since October 1992, 
Mexico had an exchange rate band policy where the floor was fixed in 
nominal terms and the ceiling crawled daily. In spite of the fact that the 
economy was growing at an average of only 3.8% per year between 
1989 and 1993, Mexico attracted a lot of attention because of two main 
elements. First, it became a leading country in terms of privatisation 
with revenues of 3.3% of GDP in both 1991 and 1992. Second, in 1993 
it was approved NAFTA, the free trade agreement of North America 
which also led Mexico to become member of the OECD. The two 
associations determined a rapid liberalisation of capital flows. 
Markets reacted with a positive mood, which is reflected in that 
49% of total capital inflows to Latin America were directed towards 
Mexico in 1990-1993. The country received US$ 23.6 billion on 
average per year, 83% of which were flows other than foreign direct 
investment (FDI). In the domestic front, higher expected returns 
eventually led to a boom in private expenditure. As a result, the deficit 
of the current account passed from US$ 7 billion in 1990 to US$ 30 
billion in 1994 and the real bilateral exchange rate with the 
US appreciated 30% in four years. 
Ros (2001) states that the crisis was not the outcome of pure 
inconsistency in economic policy, nor a pure self-fulfilling mechanism. 
He  emphasises (a) the role  played by an ill-conceived  perception that  
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the shock being faced by Mexico, higher interest rates in the US and political turmoil at home, was 
temporary and (b) the perception of a high cost involved in tightening monetary policy early in 
1994 or in modifying exchange rate policy. These two considerations led the government to react to 
those shocks selling international reserves and increasing the issuance of dollar denominated short 
term Tesobonos for exchange of the peso denominated Cetes. Reserves fell from US$ 26 billion in 
the first quarter of 1994 to US$ 16.5 billion three months later. At the same time, the debt not only 
changed denomination but the average term shortened as well. By the end of 1994, US$ 28.6 billion 
in Tesobonos were to mature during 1995, 35% of which during the first quarter of 1995 (Ros, 
2001). Given international reserves, this put the country in the wake of default and eventually led 
speculative attacks against the peso. The new government tried to change the band by devaluing the 
ceiling by 15%, but it was too late. It was forced to quit the band system, while at the same time 
interest rates skyrocketed. It was the start of the sharp and costly Tequila crisis (Calvo and 
Mendoza, 1996).23 
According to Carstens and Werner (1999), the crisis had three different aspects. One was that 
short-term capital inflows encouraged and financed the overspending that caused the before-
mentioned current account deficit. Second, even if the public debt and the fiscal balance suggested a 
healthy public sector, the short maturity of the stock of government debt exposed the country to a 
financial panic. In that context, any doubt about the will by markets to continue rolling-over the 
existing debt would cause a self-fulfilling attack on Mexican external debt. Finally, a severe 
banking crisis appeared. As the exchange rate band was abandoned in December 1994 and a float 
was adopted, there was an abrupt devaluation of about 95% between just before the crisis and 
March 1995. To avoid the inflationary consequences of such a devaluation, the Central Bank 
tightened monetary policy by raising the interest rate from 16% in December 1994 to 86% one 
quarter later. Fiscal policy was tightened by 2.6% of GDP in 1995. This entire contractionary 
package resulted in a sharp recession in 1995 in which GDP fell 6.2% and domestic demand 12.9%. 
Just after the crisis, there was a brief experience with monetary targeting, but as inflation 
came down and there was significant evidence of instability in the demand for money, the Central 
Bank started adopting annual inflation targets. According to Ortiz (2000), since 1997-1998 the 
Central Bank was converging towards inflation targeting. The main elements of the current 
framework include (a) a medium term goal of reducing inflation towards international levels in 
2003, with annual inflation targets, (b) monetary policy actions based on an assessment of 
inflationary pressures, and (c) a transparent system based on the publication of a quarterly inflation 
report. 
A basic difference in the Mexican case, against other targeteers, concerns the policy 
instrument. While most inflation targeteers use a short-term interest rate target, the Mexican Central 
Bank uses a reserve operating procedure, known as the corto. This system induces significant 
short term volatility in nominal interest rates, a feature desired by authorities in order to have a 
more stable exchange rate and, hence, a more stable inflationary environment. 
Between 1996 and 2000, Mexico lived a relatively prosperous period in which GDP growth 
averaged 5.3%; however in 2000, the economy was clearly overheated. Indeed, GDP grew 6.9%, 
well beyond estimated potential GDP growth; the real exchange rate had appreciated 13% since 
1997 and the deficit on current account more than doubled with respect to the same year, despite 
high oil prices (table 4). 
 
                                                 
23 Larraín et al. (2000) show that credit risk agencies also failed to play a countercyclical role. The main two agencies down-graded 
their rating only after the devaluation took place. 
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Table 4 
MEXICO: CAPITAL FLOWS, REAL EXCHANGE RATE AND  
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 1992-2000 




-24,442 -23,400 -29,662 -1,575 -2,330 -7,448 -16,090 -14,325 -17,690 
Net capital inflows 
(US$ million) 




-1,173 -6,057 18,398 -9,648 -1,806 -10,512 -2,138 -592 -2,824 
GDP growth (%) 3.6 2.0 4.4 -6.2 5.2 6.8 5.0 3.8 6.9 
Terms of trade 
(1995 = 100) 
105.0 104.9 103.3 100 102.8 104.0 100.4 102.3 107.4 
Real exchange 
rate (average 
1987-1990 = 100) 
74.0 70.3 72.1 106.0 95.4 83.5 84.0 76.7 71.6 
External 
debt/GDP (%) 
32.0 32.4 33.2 57.9 47.3 37.2 38.1 34.7 25.9 
Source:  ECLAC. 
In terms of the behaviour of the float, it was not a pure float as a complicated rule regulated 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. The rule included a two stepped approach in which an 
option mechanism was used to accumulate reserves and a contingent sale was used when the 
Central Bank wanted to minimise a sudden depreciation. 
This approach was conceived to fight peso appreciation and accumulate international 
reserves. Had the Central Bank intervened directly in the spot market the outcome could have been 
more similar to an exchange rate band or a soft peg. The mechanism, nowadays finished, was 
asymmetric in that it gave more emphasis in stopping a sudden depreciation than in stopping a 
sudden appreciation (Galán et al., 1999). 
This intervention mechanism and the surrender to interest rate volatility rather than to 
exchange rate volatility have determined that Mexico enjoyed significant degree of exchange rate 
stability. The adoption of the floating regime coincided with a period of high and relatively stable 
GDP growth and a significant financial stability. Of course, a substantial part of the story was due 
to the fact that Mexicos by far largest trading partner, the US, lived until 2000 a dynamic growth 
cycle, with an accelerated increase of imports (particularly from Mexico). The story changes, 
sharply for both, since late 2000. 
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V. Concluding remarks 
In the context of a more integrated world economy, ER policy is 
crucial, as it is the variable that links national prices to foreign prices. 
This policy affects how returns evolve in many significant sectors of 
the economy, such as the production of exportables. Also, being the 
outside world one of benchmarks for the opportunity cost to domestic 
investors, ER policy also affects relevant shadow prices. In this sense, 
ER policy is of most importance. 
The review of the Argentinean, Chilean and Mexican experiences 
shows that a policy that was suitable for a given macroeconomic 
environment, may not be so in another. Each ER system has its logic and 
requires measures so as to enhance the systems credibility. In this sense, 
one crucial element to bear in mind when adopting a given ER policy is 
how costly it may be to switch to an alternative policy. However, in 
some cases a public discussion about an exit strategy may have a 
negative effect on the credibility of the policy, for example in fixed ER 
regimes. 
Credible pegged systems promise more (nominal) financial 
stability and to some extent that was the case in Argentina during the 
particular period under examination. But the required complementary 
policy is high price level flexibility in order to adjust to negative real 
shocks cutting prices down. Long term credibility in this system hence 
require more flexibility in labour markets and fiscal policy in order to 
respond adequately to negative shocks. Without these measures, pegged 
systems are prone to more real sector volatility. 
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Floating systems induce more real stability but at the price of more financial instability. This 
may induce costs in terms of growth as the RER loses power to allocate resources. Hence, a 
complimentary policy if the RER loses allocative capacity is to consider the use of other policy 
instruments to promote exports such as technology policy, trade policy, etc. Floating systems are 
useful in times of financial distress when authorities have doubts concerning the level of the RER, the 
nature of the shock they face and its response to it; flotation allows them not to put in jeopardy its 
reputation defending the wrong level of the ER. 
Finally, bands are useful in times of normality, without big shocks in the horizon. In that 
context, bands contribute to stabilise the nominal exchange rate and by this mean, the RER. Stability 
in the real exchange rate has a positive effect on the quality of exports and on growth. But bands 
suffer a weakness if a big shock appears and authorities fail to have a prompt and adequate response. 
In that case, they open the way to speculation inducing significant financial instability. Probably, the 
required policy to accompany the band concerns an active intramarginal intervention within the band. 
Interventions are likely to be more effective when the ER is kept far from the edges of the band 
(Mundaca, 2000). This suggests that there may be some optimal width of the band, as the Chilean 
experience shows. 
Corner solutions do not have symmetric consequences. ER policy makes the difference when 
significant capital surges appear and subsequently shocks cause sudden reversals of these flows 
(Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo, 2001; Williamson, 2000). Most significant increases in the supply of 
external financing are not one-shot events but a process that take time: 1977-1981, 1990-1994 and 
1996-1997. When capital inflows appear, the current account deteriorates, asset prices increase and 
the real exchange rate appreciates. Each ER policy will deliver different combinations of those three 
elements. With pegged systems, an upward surge in foreign capital flows creates a demand boom, 
with consequences in asset prices, probably a crowding-out of domestic savings and a worsening of 
the external balance. Inflation in non-tradables may lead to real appreciation. With floating regimes, a 
nominal appreciation will take place making the process of real appreciation faster (and henceforth 
potentially more disruptive if the increased liquidity is transitory) than with the pegged system. In fact, 
when the force leading the direction of the capital surge is external, small economies may suffer from 
significant overvaluation. 
Pegs tend to work better in the upward phase of the cycle but after the inflection point the float 
does it better in terms of the necessary expenditure switching. As shown in Wyplosz (1999) and Ros 
(2001), in these types of cycle there is the possibility of multiple equilibria based on self fulfilling 
beliefs: expectations of more inflows (outflows) may further appreciate (depreciate) an already 
appreciated (depreciated) currency. 
Exchange rate instability is not costless, as well as large deviations from equilibrium levels of 
the RER are not costless either. Exports, both in terms of its growth rate and of its diversification, 
benefit from more stable environments (ECLAC 1998, ch. IV). Therefore, the challenges that ER 
policy faces in order to improve overall growth performance are twofold. On the one hand, to 
maximise real exchange rate stability, without pegging the currency, and on the other, to avoid 
significant currency misalignments, and floating does not impede that. Bands, the underlying obvious 
solution, may combine both but they are sensible to realisations of big shocks.24 Independently of 
the policy adopted, Central Banks cannot avoid being concerned with both the level and the stability 
of the exchange rate. In this sense, despite what has happened since the Asian crisis, crawling-bands 
are still a policy to consider by policy makers. 
                                                 
24 Wyplosz (1996), commenting a paper by Leiderman (1996), signals that the arguments in favour of bands were so strong that it was 
difficult to be skeptic about it. However, he mentioned some of the elements that ultimately led bands to trouble, among which it was 
the level of the band, that is, how could it cope with changes in the real exchange rate (e.g., because of a shock) that lied out of the 
limits of the band. 
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Latin American financial instruments suffer at least two kinds of incompleteness. One is linked 
to instruments themselves, as they lack contingency on shocks common to Latin American countries. 
Another is linked to markets, as there is a lack of sustainable foreign demand on instruments 
denominated in local currencies. Macroeconomic policies may advance in terms of completing both 
instruments and markets, but it is not clear at all that countries will be able to do both things in 
significant ways in the short run. 
In the current phase of the cycle, when there is a significant scarcity of capital inflows, many 
countries in Latin America have moved into the direction of across-the-board liberalisation of the 
capital account. However, policymakers need to be careful once the cycle changes phase. Recent 
experience in emerging economies shows that the behaviour of capital inflows can be inconsistent 
with macroeconomic sustainability, particularly in terms of the stability of the exchange rate and 
economic activity. In this sense, authorities need to follow closely the developments in different 
markets and have flexible policy packages rather than single rigid policy tools. 
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